In this paper, we examine whether the fact that governments incorporate an objective of sustainability in their budgetary decisions is an element likely to increase the likelihood of a decrease in their deficit and debt ratios beyond the crisis (over the years from 2010 to 2015). We estimate a fiscal reaction function for the Euro area countries and demonstrate that the discretionary policies seem to be pro cyclical in average, thereby influencing the budget balance in the opposite direction than the automatic stabilizers. Our simulations of these rules over the next five years lead us to conclude that two groups of countries could emerge as regards their respective budgetary situations. On the one hand, some "virtuous" countries whose structural deficits will diminish whatever the "exit crisis" scenario envisaged, whereas on the other side, others will not succeed in stabilizing their national debt ratio, because their discretionary fiscal policy is less pro cyclical.
Fiscal Developments in the European Union beyond the Crisis: Some Lessons drawn from Fiscal Reaction Functions 1.-Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to simulate the evolution of the budget balances of the euro area-countries beyond the current crisis, over a period of 5 years by 2015. We consider assumptions on the macroeconomic variables influencing budget balances (GDP growth rate, international environment, interest rates, etc) and also take into account the governments' budgetary behavior observed in the past.
The impact of economic conditions on budget balances depends, not only on the automatic stabilizers had restrained or not the use of discretionary policies, making fiscal policies less countercyclical compared to the years preceding the adoption of the Euro 2 . Since the crisis, the debate has shifted to another area of interest, namely the sustainability of public finances. Indeed, recovery plans adopted in the wake of the crisis have led Member states to significantly increase their fiscal deficits and to accumulate very high levels of debt. Several recent events suggest that financial markets do worry about the sovereign risk: in particular the downgrading of Greece, Spain or Portugal by the rating agencies and the rise of spreads in European sovereign bond spreads observed since early 2008. The recommendations to Governments by the European Commission on what should be their fiscal behavior during the coming years leave no doubt on the fact they have to consolidate their public finances, in order to stabilize their debt ratio, with the objective to go back to deficits below 3% of GDP within a close period of time (2012 to 2014 in all countries). This effort should not be limited solely to the unwinding of stimulus measures adopted during the crisis but should target, first a stabilization of debt ratios and then a drop in order to bring back them to the pre-crisis levels (and even lower when the level of debt before crisis was already considered unsustainable).
Even though there is already an abundant literature on the issue of fiscal consolidation for the European union, the current crisis context introduced several new aspects in the debate 3 . The first one concerns the 1 Public expenditure which are considered to be sensitive to the economic cycle are mainly unemployment benefits.
2 See for instance, Fatas and Mihov (2003) , Gali and Perotti (2003) , Von Hagen (2006) , Candelon and al. (2009) . 3 The theoretical literature usually focuses on the issue of the macroeconomic impacts of fiscal consolidation and the composition of fiscal adjustments (tax increase versus spending reduction). For recent studies, see in particular Afonso (2006) , Coenen and al. (2008) , Guichard and al (2007) .
size of fiscal adjustment in order to avoid in the future a default on sovereign debt, taking into account changes required on primary balances to go back to sustainable budget balances. A second aspect concerns the pace of fiscal consolidation with the possibility to follow different horizons of sustainability from one country to another in order to reflect the diversity of initial conditions and growth potential of each country.
A third aspect in the current debate relates on which deadline to set for starting fiscal consolidation, in other words the time from which a country can no more refuse to adjust because consolidation could weaken the recovery. Finally, the current crisis is an opportunity to revive an old fiscal policy debate about the choice between rules and discretionary policies to complete the consolidation of public finances. The SGP is particularly subject to questions about its ability to foster a return to sustainable levels of deficits and debt.
The rule that "Member states must meet a medium term objective of budget balance throughout a cycle" can be interpreted as a constraint of sustainability that countries must incorporate in their fiscal behavior. Such a rule is limiting the ability of countries to use discretionary policy except in exceptional and temporary ways like the current crisis. Therefore, the SGP can encourage governments to be pro cyclical when they exit form crisis in order to quickly attain the medium-term objective. But this strategy that emphasizes a balanced budget and compliance with rules of the SGP may be arbitrated with another strategy to pursue a countercyclical support for (or do not stop) economic growth. The evolution of budget balances in post-crisis times will depend on the respective importance given by Governments to these two strategic goals: economic stabilization and fiscal sustainability.
In this paper, we focus on the question of the trade-off between fiscal consolidation and economic stabilization. More specifically, we want to know whether the fact that European governments include a sustainability objective in their budgetary decisions is an element that will help deficit and public debt reduction over the next five years (2010 to 2015) . We show that the fiscal reaction functions of the European Union exhibit a pro-cyclical bias with discretionary policies having an opposite effect of automatic stabilizers on budget balances. Furthermore, our estimates show that governments attach lower importance to the sustainability objective when fiscal policies are strategic -in the sense of game theory -and when the cost of fiscal adjustment is a reduction in output. In addition, the initial situation (in 2009) of cyclical budget balances strongly influences the projected developments in deficits and debt ratios.
Our simulations show that, even in an optimistic scenario of strong economic recovery from 2010 onwards, a number of countries encounter difficulties in stabilizing their deficits below the 3% threshold by 2015 and reducing significantly their debt ratios compared to the 2009 level, in particular countries where automatic stabilizers fail to offset the negative impact on budget balances of pro cyclical discretionary policies conducted during expansions (France, Italy, the United Kingdom Greece, Portugal). In a less optimistic scenario, characterized by weak economic recovery after the crisis, these countries would face important difficulties to reduce their deficits, due to the combination of negative cyclical effects and discretionary counter-cyclical policies. Overall, our results show that in crisis exit times, two groups of countries could be identified according to their fiscal behavior. On the one hand, we would have the "virtuous" countries, which will reduce their structural deficit in all scenarios and succeed in stabilizing their debt ratio. On the other hand, we would have countries whose improvement of budgetary positions would be strongly dependant on the magnitude of the recovery.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the fiscal reaction function (the empirical framework and estimation on a panel of countries in the European Union). Section 3 is devoted to the presentation of simulation results. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
.-Estimating a fiscal reaction function for the European Union countries

.-The empirical framework
The reaction function of budgetary authorities is a reduced form equation, derived from an analytical framework where governments minimize a loss function under economic constraints. We assume that their objective is twofold. First, they seek to stabilize cyclical fluctuations, and, they also seek a public finance sustainability objective, their instrument for adjustment being the primary balance. The loss function is quadratic and is written:
,
where the operator Δ denotes the first difference of a variable, is the primary balance, is the sustainable primary balance defined here as the level that stabilize the debt ratio 4 , and is the real GDP 5 . In the European context, this type of loss function can be interpreted as follows. Governments have an objective of economic stabilization, but they must take into account a constraint that is imposed from the European Commission in the form of a rule such as "being close to sustainable budget balances". Equation (1) corresponds to a flexible interpretation of the SGP but looks closer to the reality in the sense that
Governments may recourse to a certain degree of fiscal activism. A stricter interpretation would imply the absence of any discretionary stabilization policy (only automatic stabilizers would be at play) and the GDP would not appear in the loss function.
Moreover, governments consider the effects of fiscal adjustment on output:
where the , i = 0, ..., 3 are vectors of constants, is the primary balance of a country k other than the domestic country, is a vector of variables influencing GDP (interest rates, world growth et.), ( ) is the output-gap whose impact on GDP depends on institutional factors represented by the vector (tax structure, size of automatic stabilizers, ...). The impact of the output-gap on GDP incorporates the influence of supply constraints, namely that a country faces more difficulties to increase production in a given year when the previous year's level production was close to maximum level permitted by its production capacity.
Equation (2) is important insofar as the fiscal reaction function obtained by minimizing the loss function (1) must reflect the optimal adjustment of the primary balance in order to achieve the fiscal sustainability objective, but also taking into account the impact of this adjustment on economic activity. This reduced form equation could be derived from a model of aggregate supply and demand for an open economy with a public sector.
The first-order condition of the minimization program (1) under the constraint (2) leads to the following equation:
where ,
(3) can be rewritten as follows:
with and
Trade off between fiscal sustainability and economic stabilization
If ρ = 0, the objective of sustainability is achieved instantaneously (in this case, ). If ρ approaches 1, the government maintains the same gap adjustment from one year to another, since . ρ being smaller or equal to 1, by assumption, the gap measures the degree of fiscal consolidation between two consecutive periods. The speed of adjustment ρ of the primary balance depends on the coefficient . This measures what the government "wins" in terms of increased production if it does not adjust instantaneously its primary balance to the sustainable level. Hence, is assumed to be strictly positive. The speed of adjustment, or the degree of fiscal consolidation from one period to another is as the lower (ρ increases) as the production gain is high ( increases).
Fiscal policies substitutable or complementary
Equation (3) introduces fiscal activism externalities of other countries and therefore the strategic nature of fiscal policy in an economic union. We write:
The reaction to fiscal policy of other countries intervenes with a lag of one period. Fiscal activism from the other countries is described by a positive variation of . Indeed, we interpret fiscal activism as to be, in a given year, a situation in which a country is more distant to the sustainable balance than it was in the previous year. Similarly, a positive variation of reflects fiscal activism from the home country. Consider the first part of equation (3). A positive change of implies a positive change of if <0, and a negative change if . Therefore, when the fiscal activism of a government increases production in the other countries ( ), the latter do not need implementing fiscal activism to increase their production. They can therefore consolidate their public finances ( ). In this case, fiscal policies are substitutable. In the opposite case where the externalities of fiscal activism are negative (they yield to a decrease in the production of other countries), fiscal policies are complementary and are oriented in the same direction: all countries consolidate or in the contrary reduce their budget balances.
Discretionary countercyclical and pro-cyclical policies
The vector includes two variables, namely the elasticity of tax revenues and government spending relative to GDP 6 . Let us denote and the coefficients representing these two variables, where and are the two components of the vector of equation (2). They capture the discretionary fiscal adjustments and the operation of automatic stabilizers resulting from variations of income and cyclical expenditure. At the bottom of the cycle, the economic activity deteriorates and we observe a positive change in the output gap. In this case, revenue decline ( ) and/or expenditures increase ( ), so that automatic stabilizers imply a degradation of the primary balance. If the discretionary policy is countercyclical, it plays in the same direction as automatic stabilizers. In this case, the variable in equation (6) increases (the primary balance is more distant to its sustainable level in year t that in year t-1). Note that this is the case if and , in which case and . If the discretionary policy is pro-cyclical, it plays in the opposite direction of automatic stabilizers and the sign of the coefficients is reversed if the stabilizers are of lower magnitude.
Impact of the world economic activity and monetary policy
The vector is composed of the following variables: the product of real GDP growth rate of the OECD area and the degree of openness of each economy, and the real short term interest rate in the euro area (discount rate of the European Central Bank (ECB) minus inflation rate in the euro area). We assume that monetary policy is given, in the sense that the ECB does not react to the fiscal behavior of euro area governments. On the other hand, national fiscal policies are expected to react to monetary policy. Let us denote and the coefficients of these two variables, where and are the two components of the vector in equation (2). A rise of world production increases domestic production (depending upon a country's degree of openness). In this case, and governments increase their consolidation efforts (from equation (3) and definitions of fiscal variables in (6), we can see that the variation is negative). Further, is negative in equation (2). Indeed, an increase in the ECB discount rate has a negative effect on production. Therefore, from equation (3), fiscal policy substitutes for monetary policy ( increases).
-Econometric methodology
2.2.1-The estimated equations
The estimated equation is based on the empirical framework presented in the preceding section. The data are taken from the annual database of OECD and cover thirteen European Union countries: Austria, Belgium, We consider an autoregressive equation with fixed individual effects:
To take into account the inertia of the primary budget deficits, we add lag terms in the explanatory variables.
It is noteworthy that the sustainable primary balance -the budgetary balance needed to avoid a non sustainable debt accumulation given by the equation (4) can be written as follows:
The term in brackets represents the "initial conditions" for a country, in the sense that the sustainable balance for a given year is the result of the primary balances and debts inherited from the past. A budgetary deficit one year, financed by borrowing, yields an increased in the debt ratio and this in turn feeds the fiscal deficits in the subsequent years (because debt service goes up). This makes the targeted fiscal balance timevarying and conditional on historical deficits.
In Equation (7) and . The indexes i and k indicate a country (i≠k) and the index t refers to a given year. Since the size of the automatic stabilizers depends on the tax structure of the countries, the impact of the output gap on the primary balance is conditioned by the elasticities of the revenue and the expenditure to the GDP (variables described respectively by and ). is the output gap 7 . and correspond respectively to the product of the growth rate of the OECD area and the degree of openness, and, to the short term interest rate, is the primary balance ratio to GDP. is the lagged primary balance ratio to GDP. The coefficient describes the inertia of fiscal policy and lies between 0 and 1. If it is close to 0 then the policy is discretionary and when it is close to 1 fiscal policy is very incremental. measures the fiscal adjustment for the primary balance to correspond to the sustainable balance (lagged by one period) 8 . When , fiscal policy does not have a strategic nature in the sense that a government adjusts its own intertemporal budgetary constraint, without being concerned with adjustment efforts carried out by the other countries 9 . If , measures the difference between the adjustment effort of a country and the effort of the other countries. The "others" are captured here, either by a country of reference (Germany for example), or by the average behavior of the other countries in the sample.
On the basis of discussion in the preceding section, the expected signs of the coefficients are the following.
in regard to Equation (8) 10 . When , is positive. Indeed, the condition 0≤ρ<1 in Equation (3) implies that a country carrying out an active fiscal policy in a given year ( ) must improve its budget balance the following year to meet its intertemporal budgetary constraint. When ρ=1, α is positive if fiscal policies are characterized by a strategic substitutability and negative if there is strategic complementarity. Indeed, let us suppose that the other countries implement a more active fiscal policy than the domestic country ( ) and the importance of adjustment efforts diverge in a given year, i.e. . The home country can take advantage to improve its budget balance (if α is positive), or to adjust its fiscal stance in the same direction as the others by letting its primary balance worsen (if α is negative). Regarding the sign of the variables of control, and are respectively positive and negative (an increase in cyclical revenue improves the primary balance whereas an increase in unemployment expenditure deteriorates it). is positive (an improvement of the world economic situation raises the budget balance, and, this effect increases with the degree of openness of the economy). The expected sign of is also positive. A rise of interest rate also thwarts the automatic stabilizers and thus degrades the primary balance.
7 To capture the influence of the cyclical expenditure, we retain the elasticity of unemployment to the GDP since the unemployment benefits increase during the slack periods and decrease when the economic situation improves. In addition, on the side of the expenditure, using the real GDP growth rate instead of the output gap, gives better results when one seeks to capture the impact of the cyclical expenditure related to unemployment on the primary balance.
8 When it is negative, this variable is an indicator of "financial stress", because it reflects the fiscal adjustment effort a country must undertake to reach its sustainable balance. When it is positive, it rather describes the "fiscal space" of a country, i.e. the reduction of the primary balance it can undertake to attain the sustainable level.
-The estimators used
Several empirical studies are available which propose estimates of the fiscal reaction functions for the countries of the euro area 11 . Their authors generally use two types of estimators, namely the method of the instrumental variables (IV) and the generalized moment method (GMM). However, when the number of the observations is weak, as it is the case here, these two methods can give biased estimates because of the big number of instruments when one uses for example the method of Arellano and Bover (1995) . Alternative methodologies are therefore available to remote the bias in small samples (for example LSDV estimators).
But, they do not take into account of a property generally affecting panel data when countries are members of an economic or commercial union, namely the existence of spatial correlation between the countries (correlation due to the presence of common factors or common components). Not taking into account this kind of correlation involves biases in the estimates 12 .
As showed by empirical studies, the national fiscal policies of the European Union countries share common factors 13 . Those are related to the co-movements of the economic cycles, to monetary, financial and real symmetric shocks. Another explanation of the existence of common factors is the convergence of national fiscal policies for institutional reasons, namely the existence of common fiscal rules such as the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP 14 .
In order to avoid biases related to the presence of common factors in the data of panel, various estimators were proposed in the literature. We use here the estimator of Westerlund (2007) which presents good properties for samples of small size. It has moreover the advantage of correcting possible endogeneity biases and autocorrelation/heteroscedasticity of the residuals through a non-parametric correction of the matrix of variance/covariance of the residuals which makes it comparable with a Fully-Modified estimator (FM).
Lastly, this estimator takes account of the presence of unit roots in the variables 15 .
The estimator of Westerlund (estimator BA presented in the appendix 16 ) is initially applied to Equation (7) when the variables are expressed in variation with their individual average (Within transformation).
Then, we deduce the individual fixed effects and the common intercept. This estimator is compared to the Fully-modified estimator (FM) and the estimator of quasi generalized least squares (GLS).
11 See note 1 for some references.
12 See for example Philips and Sul (2007) 14 We conclude in favor of the presence of common factors in our series by applying in a preliminary analysis the tests from Bai and Ng (2004) . The results are available upon request tot the authors..
15 "Biased adjusted", i.e. corrected bias due to the presence of common factors.
-The results
Tables 1 through 3 present the results corresponding to the different estimators used 17 . For each estimator, we consider three equations. In Equation (1), we only take into account the fiscal adjustment by the domestic country (ρ=0). Equations (2) and (3) take into account the interdependence of fiscal policies in Europe. In Equation (2), the "other countries" are represented by Germany. In Equation (3), we consider the average of budget balances of the other countries in the sample.
Impact of the indicators of sustainability
In all equations, whatever the estimator used, we obtain a positive coefficient of α, which indicates that fiscal policies have been characterized by a strategic substitutability in the recent years. Governments have thus tended to adopt active fiscal policies when their partners were carrying out, on average, fiscal consolidation measures, and conversely. This result means that fiscal policies were not necessarily coordinated and have been driven by the interests of each government, in spite of the Maastricht criteria and the SGP. The estimates in Tables 1 and 2 show that the higher the fiscal adjustment efforts in the other countries, the lower the efforts made by a country to improve its fiscal position. For example, with the estimator BA, we obtain an estimated coefficient for α of 0,452 when the sustainability constraint is individual. This coefficient becomes equal to 0.4 when the fiscal adjustment is done according to the policy adopted by Germany and drops to 0.24 when one takes into account the average of the budgetary efforts of the other countries. The differences between the values of the estimated coefficient of α appear even more significant with the estimator FMOLS in Table 2 (the coefficient is reduced from 0.51 to 0.37, and then to 0,256). Note that, the coefficient measures the sluggishness of fiscal policy. In Table 1 , its value is between 0.62 and 0.65, which means that the fiscal balance one year explains approximately two-thirds of the fiscal balance of the subsequent year.
Impact of the economic situation
An improvement of the economic situation (reflected here by a higher GDP growth rate or GDP increasing at a higher rate than its long-run trend) always reduces cyclical expenditure and therefore increases fiscal surplus (hence a negative coefficient ). The impact on cyclical revenues is however ambiguous ( is either positive or negative). To understand why, it is necessary to differentiate between the effects due to the mechanical effects and those due to the discretionary policies (governments' reaction to a boom or a recession). To this end, we re-estimate the equations by supposing that the endogenous variable is the structural budget balance 18 (estimator BA). According to the estimates in Table 4 , the discretionary 17 Estimator GLS is biased in the presence of spatial correlation. We report the estimates however in order to compare it to the other estimators.
18 Rigorously, we should retain the structural primary balance. However, the results are little changed since the debt burden is inelastic to the economic cycle. The coefficients and are hardly influenced by the choice of one or the other structural policy seems to play at the opposite of the mechanical effects of the economic activity on the fiscal position and is pro-cyclical. In this case, is negative. Consequently, during good times, governments tend to take advantage of the higher revenues generated by the favorable economic situation to increase their structural deficits, which triggers a degradation of the budget balance. Conversely, during periods of recession, they take advantage of the fall of tax revenue to reduce their expenditure, which allows an improvement of their budget balance. This result accords with several existing studies showing that, a general pro-cyclical bias in fiscal policy can uncover a strongly pro-cyclical bias during the expansion periods (the deficit is not reduced as much as it could be) and a slightly counter-cyclical bias during the recession phases (discretionary policy supports the operation of the automatic stabilizers leading to an additional widening of the deficit). In this case, this asymmetry involves a continuous degradation of structural deficits 19 .
The comparison of the results in Tables 1 and 4 leads us to conclude that the positive effect of the economic situation on fiscal revenues comes from the mechanical effects of the economic activity on the budget positions, with the discretionary policy playing in average in the opposite direction. In some cases, the mechanical effects dominate ( carries a positive sign), but the effects of discretionary can also dominate (in this case carries a negative sign). 2 Between brackets, we report the t-ratios. *, ** indicate that a coefficient is statistically significant at respectively 5%,10% level.
variable. We retain the structural budget balance which is available in the indicators of OECD, instead of applying a filter (which would be prone to criticisms) to the variable of primary balance. One will note however that the structural component comprises only part of the discretionary component of the budget policy, the governments being able to use the expenditure or the receipts to react to changes in the economic situation as we noted during the crisis of 2008/2009. 19 Other studies have shown that fiscal policy in the European countries turn to be acyclical or counter-cyclical during bad times and pro-cyclical during good times (see Deroose 
Impact of the world economic situation and of the interest rate
In all the regressions, the coefficient has the expected positive sign. In Equations (2) and (3), the impact a world growth rate (the world being here the OECD) on the primary balance is stronger in terms of magnitude than that of the other explanatory variables.
is positive. When the short-term real interest rate goes up (or drops) the budget balance improves (deteriorates). This can be interpreted as follows. When the ECB increases its short-term interest rate, it affects public finances in several manners. Firstly, we observe an impact on debt because the central bank's rate modifies the yield curve. This results in a degradation of public deficit. In reaction, to achieve budgetary sustainability, governments have to increase their primary balance. In such a situation fiscal policy is subordinated to monetary policy. Secondly, the impact of changes in the short-run interest rate operates through the effects on the economy via a decrease in investment and consumption. This indirect effect on aggregate demand implies in turn a decrease in production and reduces budget balances. To achieve sustainability, governments would also have to raise their primary surplus. This situation implies that governments share the same ECB's price stability objective and do not use fiscal policy to increase growth and unemployment.
-Evolution of public finances beyond the crisis
We combine the estimates of the fiscal reaction functions with the assumptions describing the scenarios of crisis exit to obtain projections the evolution of the deficit and debt ratios over the years from 2010 to 2015. We thus fix the future values of the exogenous variables in the equation of the fiscal reaction functions, to deduce the future trend of the primary balance (expressed as a percentage of the GDP), and those of the total balance (also expressed as a percentage of the GDP) and of the debt ratio. These simulations are projected for each country, the heterogeneity of the individual situations being unobserved and captured by the individual fixed effects.
-Assumptions on the scenarios of crisis exit
We consider two scenarios of way out of crisis, one optimistic characterized by a rapid recovery from 2010 with real GDP rates coming back to their pre-crisis level, the second less optimistic with a sluggish remaining growth.
In the optimistic scenario, the recovery is due, either to a strong growth of the world GDP (OECD area), 20 At the time we are writing this paper, the interest rates on public debt has risen for some countries, for instance in Greece where they stand at nearly 7.30% (almost 3% higher than the interest rates asked by the markets to hold the German debt. This situation is likely to be the case for other countries like Portugal, Italy and Spain which have received lower grades from the notation agencies. Accordingly, our assumption on the interest rates may appear too optimistic. The consequence of envisaging a huge increase in these rates would be a more severe deterioration of the public finance situation in comparison to the results shown by the current simulations.
The assumptions retained concerning the evolution of the output gap are in adequacy with those retained on real growth rates of the GDP. In the optimistic scenario, we retain an assumption of output gap such as the economy is in bottom of the economic cycle (output-Gap positive or null, or corresponding to the situation of 2007). In the less optimistic scenario, the assumption on output-Gap implies that the economy is at the peak of the economic cycle with an output gap equal to half of its value of the period 2002-2007.
-Public finances in the way out of crisis
We present the simulations obtained from Equations (2) and (3) (estimator BA). Indeed, it seems worthy to take into account of the strategic nature of the fiscal policies, rather than to consider that the countries do not take account of the behavior of the other countries. Moreover, in the presence of correlation between the countries of the panel due to common factors, the estimator BA is more robust than the FMOLS estimator. The results are shown in Tables (6a) , (6b), (6c) and (7a), (7b).
Optimistic scenario of crisis exit: all the exogenous variables return to their pre-crisis level
The simulations in Table ( 6a) show that a return to a pre-crisis situation (scenario 1) would widen the gap between two groups of countries.
On the one side, some countries would manage to quickly reduce their deficits, the budget balances Table ( 6a) and those of Table ( 6c) lead to conclude that budget balances of this first group of country are very sensitive to the non-discretionary components of their public finances (the total balances are much higher than the structural balances).
On the other hand, the second group is composed of countries which would not manage to reduce to a significant degree their deficits (France, the United Kingdom, Greece, Italy and Portugal). Admittedly, these countries start in 2009 with budgetary positions more degraded than those of the first group, but that does not explain all (Spain and Ireland have an initial deficit higher than France, and yet, these two countries manage more quickly to reduce their deficits during the following years). The simulations in Table (6c) make it possible to provide some explanations. In the United Kingdom and in Greece, the evolutions observed are explained by structural deficits which drop slowly and thus attenuate the positive impact of the non-discretionary components of public finances on the total balance. In France, Italy and in Portugal, the discretionary policies seem to be very pro-cyclical during the phases of economic expansion. They affect not only the medium-term balances (the structural deficits decrease only slowly), but also their short-term position (which means that the cyclical component of the budget balances of these countries captures a part of the discretionary policies). As one can note, by comparing Tables (6a) and (6c), the total budget balances of these countries are more degraded than their structural balances (see also Figures 1 and 2) .
The independent factor opposing these two groups of country is thus not so much) the initial situation of their total balance, but the initial cyclical balance (which is calculated as the difference between the total balance and the structural balance and which comprises a very important discretionary component taking into account the stimulus packages adopted during the crisis). Moreover, the pro-cyclic character of the discretionary policy does not help a rapid reduction of the deficits.
The situation of Germany lies between these two opposed groups' but resembles that of France, Italy and
Portugal. The situation of Spain is rather similar to that of the United Kingdom and Greece (the difference being that the reduction of the deficits is more rapid).
The simulations in Table ( 6b) show that one needs a very strong sensitivity of the budget balances to the economic situation (either domestic, or international) so that the positive effect of the mechanical effects of a stronger growth compensate the negative influence of the discretionary policies and makes it possible for the budget balances to improve significantly.
The debt dynamics is the result of the accumulated deficits. The debt ratio starts to drop only when the improvement of budget balances is significant. We observe situations where the debt exhibits a snowball effect, while at the same time the deficits starts to decline (it could be the case for example of countries in the second group).
Less optimistic scenario of crisis exit: all the exogenous variables return to half their pre-crisis level in 2010 and then remain on this level until 2015.
In the less optimistic scenario, domestic and world growth rates remain only at half their pre-crisis level Italy and in Portugal (see Table 7a and Figures 1,2 ). The consequence would be then a snowball effect, the debt dynamics producing a continuous increase in the debt ratios. In spite of this degradation observed in most countries, it is necessary to distinguish two types of countries: those whose degradation can be attributed to the economic situation only (the discretionary policy of these countries is strongly pro-cyclical when the activity is weak and results in a reduction of the structural deficits) and those whose discretionary policy does not contribute to a drop in the structural deficits (the policy being then slightly pro-cyclical, even counter-cyclical if we consider that the cyclical component situation of the total balance capture a part of the reaction of governments in the case of a weak recovery). Table ( 7c) shows that, in spite of the context of weak recovery, the structural deficits would decrease significantly in Austria, in Belgium, in Germany, in Spain, in Ireland and in the Netherlands (they would turn positive in Finland and in Luxembourg). On the other hand, the structural deficits would decrease little in France, in the United Kingdom and in Portugal, and, would increase even in Greece and Italy.
The deficits observed would be less important in a context where budget balances would be strongly sensitive to the economic situation, as shown by the simulations in Table (7b) .
-Conclusion
Several lessons can be drawn from this work. First of all, it highlights the critical situation of public finances of some countries, whatever the scenario of way out of crisis (fast recovery or weak growth) if governments do not modify the budgetary behavior they followed in the past. If the recovery were to be weak, then budget balances would be strongly degraded under the combined effect of the economic situation and a widening of the structural deficits, the discretionary policies being slightly counter-cyclical when the activity is weak. France would belong to this group of countries concerned with this situation, besides the United Kingdom, Greece, Italy and Portugal. Even in the event of strong recovery, one would need a strong action of the mechanical effects of a positive growth on the budget balances to compensate for pro-cyclical discretionary policies in phase of economic expansions which tend to degrade budget balances. The second conclusion to be drawn is a divergence of the budget situations of France and Germany in crisis exit. This divergence is observed in particular in the evolutions of the structural balances. In Germany, this balance improves, whatever the scenario of way out of crisis (it could even become positive in the event of strong recovery). In France, the deficits would fall slowly and would remain above 3% of GDP at least until 2015.
The third conclusion is the emergence of two groups of countries as regards the budgetary behaviors, which we will call "virtuous" and "lax". The first group is composed of countries where budget balances improve in the event of fast recovery and where the structural deficits are reduced in the event of weak recovery.
Germany, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Ireland belong to this group. The second group is composed of the other countries. The discretionary policy is less pro-cyclical there and the improvement of their budget balances remains strongly dependant on a strong recovery.
These results raise the question of the effectiveness of the budgetary rules in Europe. The Treaty introduced the thresholds of 3% for the public deficit and 60% for the public debt for the entry into the There are several extensions to this paper. Firstly, one could assume that the gain of non-adjustment in terms of production (which is captured here by ) varies with the potential growth. Therefore, we could imagine that the speed of consolidation could depend upon past potential growths. An interesting question raised by the recent crisis was whether the depression involved a deterioration of production capacities, human capital and of the other variables playing an influence on potential output. In case of a lower potential growth, governments may search to activate policies aiming at upgrading the medium term capacity level of the economies (which would imply for instance a higher financing of supply policies and thus a degradation of public finances). -4,3773 -6,0589 -3,6979 -11,2601 -2,9955 -8,8658 -13,2152 -12,3084 -12,1084 -5,8045 -1,9779 -5,3503 -8,3006 2010 -7,5703 -5,8262 -4,5231 -9,8197 -2,3044 -8,6779 -11,9606 -11,3123 -12,5095 -6,7786 -2,2616 -4,6015 -9,2449 2011 -5,7941 -1,7785 -4,8056 -8,4897 -0,6273 -8,3377 -11,1943 -11,7566 -7,9350 -8,5451 6,5713 -2,1638 -9,3041 2012 -2,6884 3,4457 -3,0975 -5,4036 2,2239 -6,4186 -8,2621 -8,5059 -0,9293 -6,0795 13,0716 1,4044 -7,4439 2013 -0,6309 7,0317 -2,0153 -3,3266 4,1482 -5,2035 -6,3709 -6,3122 3,7591 -4,4745 17,2628 3,8222 -6,2834 2014 0,7707 9,5899 -1,3134 -1,9301 5,4811 -4,4308 -5,1397 -4,8263 6,8443 -3,4105 19,8580 5,5193 -5,5627 2015 1,7623 11,5042 -0,8420 -0,9923 6,4364 -3,9358 -4,3273 -3,8147 8,8258 -2,6785 -4,3773 -6,0589 -3,6979 -11,2601 -2,9955 -8,8658 -13,2152 -12,3084 -12,1084 -5,8045 -1,9779 -5,3503 -8,3006 2010 -6,4803 -4,9462 -3,7501 -8,6757 -0,9874 -7,5039 -10,6006 -9,9023 -10,9395 -5,8286 -1,1016 -3,4915 -8,1749 2011 -3,9648 -0,3010 -3,5080 -6,5768 1,5730 -6,3702 -8,9052 -9,3915 -5,3184 -6,9531 8,4964 -0,3029 -7 -4,3773 -6,0589 -3,6979 -11,2601 -2,9955 -8,8658 -13,2152 -12,3084 -12,1084 -5,8045 -1,9779 -5,3503 -8,3006 bar of the -3% (date) -3,1500 -1,6000 -1,5600 -5,9200 1,2400 -5,0400 -10,4620 -4,3060 -7,2900 -2,1800 0,0280 -3,4300 -3,8200 2010 -2,9484 -1,2930 -1,0503 -5,0120 2, 4537 -4,4708 -8,8745 -4,7131 -5,9722 -2,0649 1,4871 -2,6321 -3,5111 2011 -2,6416 -1,1997 -1,2432 -4,7620 2,7581 -4,5435 -8,5831 -5,7188 -5,7951 -3,0278 3,0586 -2,2211 -3,7648 2012 -1,7709 -0,3408 -0,7941 -3,8590 3,5495 -4,0499 -7,5481 -5,4307 -4,4145 -2,6717 4,5474 -1,2725 -3,3516 2013 -1,0547 0,3670 -0,4322 -3,1026 4,2011 -3,6453 -6,6931 -5,1841 -3,2603 -2,3791 5,7523 -0,4914 -3,0129 2014 -0,4655 0,9506 -0,1413 -2,4709 4,7370 -3,3139 -5,9869 -4,9729 -2,3013 -2,1393 -4,3773 -6,0589 -3,6979 -11,2601 -2,9955 -8,8658 -13,2152 -12,3084 -12,1084 -5,8045 -1,9779 -5,3503 -8,3006 bar of the -3% (date) Definition of the variables used and codes in the OECD database 1.-Primary balance as ratio of GDP NLG : financial balance of public administration GDP : nominal GDP We compute the ratio of both variables 2. Output-gap GAP : output-gap of the economy 3.-Elasticity of government revenues with respect to GDP The elasticity is computed using the GDP and YRGT (total revenues of public administrations)
4.-Growth rate of OECD countries We compute the growth rate of OECD GDP
5.-Degree of openness
We compute the sum of MGS (imports of goods and services in local currency)+XGS (exports of goods and services in local currency) as share of GDP 6.-Short term-interest rate (real) We compute the difference between IRS (nominal short-term interest rate) and the growth rate ofr CPI (consumer price index) 7.-Elasticity of unemployment rate to GDP Computed using UNR (unemployment rate and GDP) 8.-Sustainable primary balance an budgetary gap Defined as the primary balance implying a stability of debt ratio:
R is defined as GNINTP (interest rate expenses (net) paid by public administration) over GGFL(-1) public debt.
is the growth rate of GDP and d is GGFLQ( public debt as share of GDP).
We then define the domestic budgetary gap as the difference . We also define the budgetary gap of the other countries by considering the average of across countries except the domestic country.
